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In a very inﬂuential article, Ron Shachar and Barry Nalebuff (SN 1999)
develop and estimate empirically a pivotal-leader model of political partic-
ipation with the following characteristics. The leaders of party p = D,R
decide how much effort Ep expend to get followers to vote. The propor-
tion of followers of party p that turn out to vote on election day is equal
to yp(Ep,x,e), where x represents observable factors inﬂuencing participa-
tion and e is some random term with density f(e). The fraction of voters
favorable to party D is a random variable ˜ d with density h(·) and distribu-
tion function H(·). The realizations of e and d are unknown to leaders at
the moment of deciding on effort levels. Thus, the probability of party D











The cost of effort is C(Ep,N), where N is the electorate size. Letting V
denote the value of winning ofﬁce, the expected utility of the leaders of
parties D and R as a function of effort levels are, respectively,
UD(ED,ER) = VP(ED,ER)−C(ED,N), (2)
UR(ED,ER) = V(1−P(ED,ER))−C(ER,N). (3)
SN adopt the following functional forms
yp(Ep,x,e) = exp(rEp+bp+x·b+e), (4)
C(Ep,N) = E2
p/2+h·N·Ep.
SN claim that, given the functional forms in (4), the objective functions of
parties D and R are concave with respect to the parties’ own effort, and
therefore they focus on the solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions derived
from equations (2) and (3). In this note, (I) I prove that the claim is incor-
rect, (II) provide conditions under which the objective functions are con-
cave, and attempt to verify whether these conditions hold for the parameter
values estimated by SN.
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I. A FAILURE OF CONCAVITY: AN EXAMPLE
SN assume for the structural estimation of their model that ˜ d is normally
distributed. This is, of course, not very convenient for a random variable
with support (0,1), but can be taken as an approximation if the variance is
small enough. Suppose, then, that ˜ d is approximated in the interval (0,1) by
a normal random variable with mean µ and variance s. (In the next section
more general forms of uncertainty are considered.)
The derivative of the objective function of party p = D,R with respect to








From the ﬁrst-order conditions, if there is an interior equilibrium, it must
satisfy
ED = ER =V ·h(a)a(1−a)r−h·N,
where a = exp(bR)/(exp(bR)+exp(bD)) (cf. Proposition 2 in SN). Under
the normality assumption we have









where f is the standard normal density.
Suppose, forinstance,V =1, bD =bR, µ=1/2, s=0.0378, r=0.6, h=
0.15 and N = 62
3.1 For these parameter values, in an interior equilibrium,
ED = ER ≈ 0.5831.
Figures 1 and 2 below show the objective function of party D for ER =
0.5831. The objective function achieves a local maximum at approximately
0.5831 (Figure 1) but it achieves a global maximum at 0 (Figure 2).
1The values of s, r and h are those estimated by SN, while the others are adopted
for illustration purposes. SN seem to measure electorate size in millions (see the ﬁrst
paragraph in page 542).FOLLOW THE LEADER: A COMMENT 3
 
 
FIGURE 1: A LOCAL MAXIMUM… 
 
 
FIGURE 2: BUT NOT A GLOBAL MAXIMUM 
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It is possible to check that the corner point ED = ER = 0 is not an equi-
librium either. Figure 3 shows the objective function of party D for ER = 0.
Thus, there is no (pure strategy) equilibrium in this example. First-order






FIGURE 3: THERE IS NO CORNER EQUILIBRIUM 
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II. CONDITIONS FOR CONCAVITY
The second derivative of the objective function of parties D and R with














(The argument of the function a is omitted for briefness.) Thus, the objec-
tive functions of parties D and R are strictly concave with respect to their











for all x ∈ (0,1).
Feddersen and Sandroni (FS 2001) develop an ethical-voter model of
political participation with micro foundations that differ from those of SN,
but arrive at a problem similar to that described by the objective functionsFOLLOW THE LEADER: A COMMENT 5
(2)and(3), withEp interpretednowastheshareofsupportersofparty pthat
turns out to vote.2 To obtain concavity, FS assume that P is strictly concave
in ED and (1−P) is strictly concave in ER. (FS foundations guarantee that
C is a convex function.) Unfortunately, this assumption would not work
in the SN model because it implies that −h0(x)x(1−x)+2h(x)(x−1/2) is
simultaneously positive and negative.
Coate and Conlin (CC 2004) develop and estimate another ethical-voter





where v > 0, u > 0. Using (5), this assumption leads to the following con-











for all x ∈ (0,1).
This condition is easily checked since the ﬁrst order condition for comput-
ing the maximum and the minimum of the middle expression is a quadratic





















for all x ∈ (0,1).
For instance, if s = 0.0378 and r = 0.6 (the values estimated by SN) and
µ = 0.46 (the average Democratic vote share in the data used by SN, state-
by-state data for eleven US presidential elections, 1948-1988),3 concavity
requires V < 0.262. In SN model, V = S+Rjt, where S is the component
of the value of winning the state’ presidential vote that is independent from
winning the national election, and Rjt is the chance that state j is pivotal in
presidential election t. SN estimate S = 0.0790, so that concavity requires
Rjt < 0.183. In their estimates of pivotal probabilities (cf. Table 8B), this
upper bound is violated only in three cases: New York in 1960 and Penn-
sylvania and Texas in 1948.
2In the FS setup, the maximization of UD and UR with respect to ED and ER is not
a problem explicitly solved by political leaders but rather an equilibrium condition for
participation rules adopted by ethically-motivated supporters of each party.
3SN estimate (though not report) different values of µjt for each state and election year.
Ideally, those estimates should be used to compute different upper bounds for Rjt.FOLLOW THE LEADER: A COMMENT 6
III. CONCLUSION
The objective functions (2) and (3) are not necessarily concave under
the functional forms given in (4), as opposed to what is claimed by SN.
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for concavity is provided by equation
(5) in this note. Assuming normal uncertainty, as SN do, the concavity
condition is given by equation (7). The parameters estimated by SN using
state-by-state data for presidential elections seem to satisfy equation (7) for
most states and election years, with very few exceptions corresponding to
states with an exceptionally high pivotal probability. In those few cases, it
remains to be veriﬁed that the solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions derived
from (2) and (3) actually corresponds to a global maximum of the estimated
objective functions of the parties. If the solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions
does not maximize the objective functions, it does not seem appropriate to
use those data points in an estimation relying on an equilibrium model.
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